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Abstract—The range of verification problems that can be solved with logic model checking tools has increased significantly in the last
few decades. This increase in capability is based on algorithmic advances and new theoretical insights, but it has also benefitted from
the steady increase in processing speeds and main memory sizes on standard computers. The steady increase in processing speeds,
though, ended when chip-makers started redirecting their efforts to the development of multicore systems. For the near-term future, we
can anticipate the appearance of systems with large numbers of CPU cores, but without matching increases in clock-speeds. We will
describe a model checking strategy that can allow us to leverage this trend and that allows us to tackle significantly larger problem
sizes than before.
Index Terms—Software engineering tools and techniques, logic model checking, distributed algorithms, software verification.
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1I NTRODUCTION
L
IKE other compute intensive applications, logic model
checking techniques have benefitted from the steady
increases in CPU-speeds and memory sizes in the last few
decades, following Moore’s prediction [4]. The current
trend in chip development, though, is a move away from
further increases in CPU speed and is instead focused on
increasing the number of CPU cores.
To continue to scale applications of logic model
checking to larger problem sizes then, we must be able to
leverage the availability of potentially large numbers of
processors that run at a mostly fixed and relatively low
speed. These types of systems are not only increasingly
available in the form of multicore desktop systems, but also
more generally as networked computers or server farms
offering grid or cloud-computing services. In this paper,
we report on an application of logic model checking that
can build on these trends.
We focus here on the SPIN model checker [8] as a
representative tool for solving computationally expensive
search problems, but the basic principles of parallelism and
search diversification that we explore apply also more
generally to other types of search-based processes.
TheSPINmodelcheckercanbeusedtolocateviolationsof
formalized correctness properties in distributed software
system designs. It does so by performing a search in a
carefully defined subset of the possible executions of the
system. The details of the search process, and the underlying
theory of logic model checking, are not important to us here.
What is important are the constraints that we face when
trying to handle larger and larger problem sizes. In the early
days of model checking, the limited size of main memory
was often the most important constraint on the size of
problems that could be handled. Today, this is no longer the
case. Memory sizes have increased dramatically and are
expected to continue to increase for some time to come. As
we will show though, even with the currently available
memory sizes (near 102 GB), a SPIN model checking run that
would attempt to use all of main memory will generally
require more time to complete than we are normally willing
to spend (i.e., days or weeks). Our goal in this study is to
develop a verification strategy that allows us to obtain high
quality results for large verification problems in minutes or
hours, not days or weeks, and we want those results to scale
with increasing numbers of processing cores or CPUs.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.1, we first
look at how memory size and runtime are related for SPIN
based verifications. The basic observation is simple: As the
data-structures we build in main memory grow, so does the
time that is required to do so, until we reach a point where
we can no longer afford to spend that time. In Sections 2.2
and 2.3, we look at different strategies that can be, or that
have been, used to tackle this problem. In Section 3, we look
in detail at the different types of algorithms we can use to
diversify and to randomize the model checking algorithm
used in SPIN. In Section 3.1, we first study the effect of
diversification alone. In Section 3.2, we then consider the
added benefit of randomizations. In Section 4, we measure
the performance of our proposed new strategy on a range of
applications, with added detail provided in Appendix A.
Section 5 shows how the setup for a swarm search can be
simplified with a small preprocessor for the SPIN model
checker, which we have called SWARM. Section 6 discusses
related work and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2S PIN
The time requirement of a SPIN verification run is bounded
by both the size of the reachable state space and the size of
available memory. If M bytes of memory are available, each
state requires V bytes of storage, and the model checker on
average explores S reachable states per second, then a
verification run can last no longer than M=ðS   VÞ seconds.
If, for example, M is 64 MB, V is 64 bytes, and S is 104 states
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arena is 102 seconds. The search terminates either when all
reachable states have been visited or when memory is
exhausted. If there are more states than can be stored in
memory, the search will remain incomplete.
2.1 Bit-State Verification
An interesting effect occurs if we switch from an exhaustive
verification mode, as outlined above, to a bit-state verifica-
tion [6]. In this mode, the model checker can achieve a much
higher coverage of large state spaces by using just a few bits
of memory per state stored. The precise number of bits that
is used per state cannot be determined accurately in this
case since states can in fact overlap in their bit-positions
(without ill effects on the accuracy of a search). Each bit-
position is calculated with a hash-function. The current
version of SPIN uses three different hash-functions by
default, setting between one and three additional bit-
positions for each new state explored.
Let us assume that each new state that is explored in this
mode consumes 0.5 bytes of memory and that the speed of
the model checker is approximately 108 states per hour
(about 3 K states/sec). Under these assumptions, the model
checker can use no more than 108  0:5 bytes of memory per
hour of run time, or roughly 50 MB. It is easy to see that
moving up to 8 GB then increases the maximum runtime to
about a week of computation. In return, we would cover
significantly more states, but both time and space are
limited resources, so the increased coverage of a problem
space is not always achievable in practice. To make the
point perhaps more strongly, if we increase the available
memory size to 64 GB, a maximal bit-state search could
consume close to two months of computation, which is no
longer a feasible strategy, no matter how many states are
explored in the process or how much problem coverage
would be improved.
We are thus faced with a dilemma. The applications that
we are trying to verify with model checkers are increasing
in size, especially when we start applying model checkers to
implementation level code, cf. [7], [9], [2], [21], [10]. As state
descriptors grow in size from tens of bytes to tens of
kilobytes, processing speeds will also drop. As we observed
in the introduction, these performance differences are no
longer offset by continued CPU clock-speed increases, so
they will contribute to even longer verification times. For
very large applications, a bit-state search is typically the
only feasible verification option available to us, as it can
increase the problem coverage (i.e., the number of reachable
states explored) by several orders of magnitude when
compared to a standard exhaustive search attempt. Ex-
haustive coverage for these applications is impractical,
given the enormous size of both the state descriptors and
the numbers of reachable states. In these cases, we have to
find ways to perform the best achievable approximation of
an exhaustive search, balancing both memory use and
runtime constraints. Technically, the right solution in these
cases is to apply stronger reduction and abstraction
techniques to reduce the problem size as much as possible.
We are assuming here that the best possible abstractions
and restrictions have already been applied and that the
remaining problem size still significantly exceeds available
resource limits.
2.2 Multicore Verification
One strategy to combat the performance issue we have
sketched above is to tap directly into the availability of
increasing number of processing cores, communicating via
shared memory. Direct (or collaborative) multicore model
checking algorithms are indeed available. For the SPIN
model checker, we have described such an algorithm
elsewhere [11]. In the best cases, the multicore algorithms
can provide near linear scaling with the number of available
processing cores. Returning to our earlier example, using
eight cores in parallel, each exploring 108 states per hour in
bit-state mode, can reduce a runtime of 6.8 days on an 8 GB
systemto 20.4hours anda runtime oftwo monthsona 64 GB
system to a week. Serious limits remain though. Even if we
assume optimistically that we can achieve near linear scaling
on large numbers of cores, it would take about 164 cores to
bring the last runtime number down to a more reasonable
runtime limit of approximately 1 hour.
This then puts an interesting spin on the problem. The
doubling interval for memory sizes is currently considerably
shorter than the doubling interval for the number of CPU
cores. This means that the performance gap we sketched will
continue to grow. By the time that 164 processing cores will
be available on a single system, the memory size on that
system will have grown as well and it will be much larger
than the 64 GB that we assumed in our last calculation. The
maximum runtime will therefore also have increased
significantly. For the amount of memory that is available at
any point in time, the number of CPU cores that one would
need to reduce the runtime sufficiently is likely to exceed the
maximum number of cores that is available at the same point
in time by a significant margin.
We would like to make use of as many resources as are
actually available to us at any point in time to get the best
possible coverage of large verification problems, but only
within a predefined time limit. It is undesirable to start a
verification run on a large machine and wonder, after a few
days have passed, if the run is about to complete or might
continue for another month, with no indication of the actual
coverage of the search problem that has been realized at any
given point in time.
2.3 Parallelism and Search Diversity
For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that there is
an upper bound on the time that is available for any
verification run, especially for large problem sizes. To make
the challenge specific, we will assume an upper bound of
one hour of computation. With a fixed exploration rate, this
means that we cannot use more than a few Gigabytes of
memory in an exhaustive verification and no more than
about 50 to 500 MB in a bit-state exploration.
For very large verification problems, we have to accept
that a time-bounded search for errors will generally remain
incomplete. It is therefore important that we do not expend
all our resources on a single search strategy. Within the time
available, we should approach the search problem from a
number of different angles—each with a different chance of
revealing errors.
Our strategy therefore is to leverage both parallelism and
search diversity. To study the effectiveness of candidate
strategies to solve this problem, we will begin by using a
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space. The model is defined in such a way that we can
easily identify every reachable state and measure the
individual and cumulative effectiveness of a range of
different search strategies. The example, written in the
specification language of SPIN, is shown in Fig. 1.
The test model shown in Fig. 1 defines the behavior of
eight asynchronously executing processes, each of which
executes a loop with four possible execution steps that can
be selected nondeterministically. Each process has a
predefined id number, named _pid, with a value between
zero and seven in this case. At each execution step, an
arbitrary process is selected by the model checker, and that
process will select one of its four possible execution steps at
random. We have defined the model in such a way that
each process “owns” four bits from the 32-bit global integer
variable val. A process can either set one of these bits or
leave them zero, but each time it sets a bit, it performs a
check to see if a particular 32-bit target value was reached.
The check is defined as an inline function check() that checks
for a match with a predefined set of 100 32-bit target values,
generated with the help of a random number generator
when we defined the model. If one of the target numbers is
matched, a line is printed. We can assess the quality of a
search attempt by counting how many of the 100 numbers
are matched in a run. The target numbers are used here to
represent generic search targets or in terms of logic model
checking “property violations” that we would like to be
able to locate in large search spaces.
Clearly, there will be 232 (over 4 billion) possible
assignments to the 32-bit integer val. Each state descriptor
for the model as a whole is relatively small at 76 bytes.
Storing all reachable states exhaustively, however, would
require more than 300 GB of memory.
If, therefore, we perform a traditional search on a
machine with no more than 3 GB, an exhaustive search
cannot reach more than 1 percent of the state space, and
statistically we may expect just one match within the set of
target numbers. A bit-state search could in principle store
all states in this amount of memory. For this example, the
model checker explores approximately 6   104 states per
second on a 2.3 GHz system, which means that exploring
the full statespace sequentially in bit-state mode would take
about 20 hours, assuming a sufficient amount of memory is
available to record all states.
We are interested, though, in the case where we are
forced to use less memory than what would suffice for a full
search—even in bit-state mode. We will therefore limit the
amount of memory that we make available to the search to
just 32 MB (or 0.01 percent of the 300 GB required for an
exhaustive search) and study what can be achieved in terms
of state coverage by exploiting parallelism and search
diversification techniques. Note that 32 MB corresponds to
8   32   1024   1024 ¼ 268;435;456 bits (or 6.25 percent of
the 4 billion states that are generated by our test model).
A default run of the model checker using a bit-state
memory arena of 32 MB can be done as follows, using a
standard Linux command shell:
$ spin -a model.pml
$ cc -DBITSTATE -o pan pan.c
$ ./pan -w28 |
grep “assertion violated”|
sort -u |
wc -l
4
This search reaches 1:56   108 states, or about 3.6 percent
of the 232 reachable states. It locates 4 percent of the
randomly seeded target numbers in that search space.
Which numbers are found will depend on the search order
that is used in the model checker. Normally, this search
order is irrelevant when all states are covered in the end. In
partial or incomplete searches though, the search order used
can bias the search in an undesirable way by systematically
always missing the same parts of the search space.
The challenge that we will consider next is to increase the
number of matches from 4 to 100 percent, without changing
the memory constraint of 32 MB that we imposed.
HOLZMANN ET AL.: SWARM VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES 847
Fig. 1. Spin model for generating all 32-bit numbers. Test model to illustrate the effect of search diversification strategies.3S EARCH DIVERSIFICATION
Our strategy will be to use a range of different search
methods, and to run as many small verification jobs as
possible in parallel, using all available CPUs (local CPU
cores and/or networked machines). Because we will use no
more than 32 MB per search, on a multicore system with
8 GB of memory we could in principle run up to 256 jobs in
parallel without exhausting memory.
There are several methods that we can use to diversify
the search process in the SPIN model checker. We can
change, for instance:
. the hash-polynomials that Spin uses to compute the
bit-state locations during a search (with runtime
parameter -h),
. the number of hash-functions used, i.e., the
number of bit-positions set per state (with runtime
parameter -k), or
. the search algorithm that is used to perform the
search itself (we will consider this option in more
detail later).
As a first experiment, we can check the effect of just varying
the hash-polynomials, leaving everything else fixed. (The
use of hash-polynomials in bit-state hashing is discussed in
detail in [6] and can also be found in [8].) Here is the result
of that experiment:
$ for h in 0 5 11 17
do
./pan -w28 -h$h
done |
grep “assertion violated”|
sort -u|
wc -l
9
We performed four runs (which can all be done in parallel,
and therefore take no more time than a single run) and the
number of unique matches increased from four to nine,
more than doubling our coverage.
We can expand the search further by also varying the
number of hash functions (-k). The default number of hash-
functions in SPIN verifications is three, but we can use other
numbers as well. We can execute this set of runs with a
nested for-loop in the Bourne (or bash) shell:
$ for k in 1 2 3 4
do
f o rhi n051 11 7
do
./pan -w28 -k$k -h$h
done
done |
grep “assertion violated”|
sort -u |
wc -l
24
The number of unique matches increased from 9 to 24 by
performing 16 small independent searches that can still all
be executed in parallel. None of the individual searches
uses more than 32 MB of memory.
3.1 Adding Randomization
We mentioned the possibility of increasing diversification
further by varying the search algorithm that we use in the
state space exploration itself. One of the methods we can
use is a randomization of the search order. In a SPIN-based
model-checker we can introduce randomization at two
specific points in the search where nondeterminism is
resolved, i.e., in
. process scheduling decisions and
. transition selections within processes.
The use of randomization has the advantage that it can
support a large variety of behaviors merely by selecting
different seeds for the random number generator. Each
separate search can be expected to have approximately the
same runtime performance, being constrained in the same
manner by our self-imposed time and/or memory limits.
But each search variant can also be expected to explore a
different subset of states and locate different types of
defects (or search targets). Cumulatively, all search variants
combined, executed in parallel, can thus outperform any
one variant used separately.
To perform a proof of concept of this strategy, weperform
a separate experiment using just the search randomization
technique, with a fixed hash-function and using only single-
bit hashing (-h0 -k1). We start by generating a file with a
hundred random numbers to be used as seeds. For each
small run we take a different number from this file and use it
to seed the random number generator.
A shell-script for performing one hundred runs using
SPIN version 5.2 or later, can be written as follows:
In this example, all verification jobs are executed sequen-
tially on a single CPU. When using a multicore machine, we
can execute as many of these jobs in parallel as there are
available cores. In a larger network, all jobs can be executed
in parallel for a fast turnaround. At the end of the runs, all
targets in the test model were reached. This is especially
interesting because we used only search randomization to
define these runs, and no other type of diversification. None
of the runs used more than 32 MB or 0.01 percent of the
300 GB of memory that is required to complete a standard
exhaustive verification of the problem.
Clearly the number of runs that are needed to reach a
specific level of coverage of a large search space must
increase when the amount of available memory for each
searchisreducedand,viceversa,whenmemoryisincreased,
the number of runs may be reduced. For a memory arena of
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problem. If we repeat the experiment with a memory arena
thatistwiceaslarge(using64MBofmemory,corresponding
to 0.02 percent of 300 GB), then we can reach full coverage of
the sample problem in 32 runs. If we reduce the memory
arena to 16 MB (0.005 percent of 300 GB) it takes
236 randomized runs to reach full coverage for our sample
problem, as summarized in Table 1.
These simple experiments suggest that we can signifi-
cantly increase our coverage of large search spaces by using
search diversification and randomization techniques, and
by running many small jobs in parallel. The incremental
effect of additional runs decreases as more and more runs
are added. The maximum number of runs that can be
performed within a given time limit will also be bounded
by the number of available CPUs. Within the available
resource bounds though, we can develop search strategies
that can give us the best possible results.
4A PPLICATION
The test model from Fig. 1 illustrates the potential of
swarm verification techniques. No single example can, of
course, be representative of large search problems in
general. In this case, the test model defined a search
problem with a relatively shallow search depth of 32 steps.
This could limit the effectiveness of hash-diversification
and benefit search randomization techniques. We have
therefore also performed an extensive series of measure-
ments with more typical verification models of various
sizes and search depths.
4.1 Methodology
Our goal in performing a range of more detailed measure-
ments is to study the behavior of swarm verification when
compared with standard model checking. The primary
metric in the comparisons we perform is coverage: the
fraction of the reachable statespace that is reached with each
method. A second metric is resource use: the time and
memory needed to complete each type of run.
To be able to make accurate comparisons, we use models
with precisely known structure and size. The models
selected for these measurements are nontrivial, yet small
enough to be exhaustively verifiable.
We can reproduce the effect of a resource constrained
system by varying the amount of memory that we make
available for each run. In each test we compare the coverage
that is realized by a swarm run with the one realized by
single verification runs (the reference). By disabling search
options that can cause unpredictable differences in the
statespace sizes explored, (e.g., partial order reduction), we
can accurately measure what fraction of a state space is
visited and what fraction is missed in each test. To show
that partial order reduction in itself is not an impediment to
the coverage improvement of swarm verifications, we also
performed tests with it enabled (Fig. 4).
We use five different test models. The first four models
can be exhaustively explored with standard techniques and
serve as our main target for comparisons. The fifth model is
added as an example of a very large application that cannot
be verified fully with traditional means. In this last case, we
can still compare the number of states that are reached with
each method, but we cannot determine what fraction of the
statespace these numbers correspond to. In this one case,
we only know that the larger the increase in the number of
states reached is, within the same resource constraints, the
greater the search improvement that is realized will be (cf.
Fig. 4).
4.2 Models
We study the following three medium and two large size
verification models:
. a data transfer protocol model, dtp,
. a file transfer verification model, pftp,
. a model of the Cambridge ring network protocol,
cambridge,
. a large model of an operating system kernel
developed at Honeywell, called DEOS, and
. a very large a model of an experimental network
architecture design, called fleet.
The first three models are taken from the standard SPIN
distribution and are frequently used in performance
measurements. The DEOS model was also discussed in
[17] and used in [11]. The fleet model was provided to us by
Sanjit Sehia from the University of California Berkeley.
Table 2 summarizes some key characteristics of each
model. The search depth is the maximum number of steps
that the model checker takes in the depth-first search before
reaching a previously visited state. The size of each state is
given in bytes.
Inourtestsofthefirstthree(small)models,weperformed
theverificationwithoutusingpartialorderreduction[8].This
allows us to eliminate a potential source of confusion in the
generally unpredictable effect of a partial order reduction on
statespace sizes. For each run performed, we must know
precisely how many states should be reached, to allow us to
accurately measure the fraction that was effectively reached.
For the pftp verification model we also disabled several
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TABLE 1
Coverage of Randomized Runs
TABLE 2
Applicationsother features in the verifier, such as statement merging,
dataflow optimization and dead-variable elimination, by
generating the model checker as follows:
$ spin -a -o1 -o2 -o3 -o4 pftp.pml
The default optimizations normally decrease the number of
reachable states. Because our objective in these experiments
is to measure the fraction of all system states that is reached
by different search strategies, a somewhat larger state count
helps to make the measurements more meaningful. (An
alternative could have been to use slightly larger models
that can still be exhaustively verified.)
We can calculate how much memory would be required
to perform an exhaustive verification for the first four
models by multiplying the number of reachable states with
the size of each state. The first two applications then require
approximately 64 MB of memory for exhaustive explora-
tion, the third application 30 MB, and the DEOS application
13 GB. The total state space size for the fleet model is at least
1011 states, but otherwise unknown. This means that
exhaustive exploration with traditional search algorithms
would require at least 130 TB. This last search problem then
is representative of the type of very large applications for
which we would like to develop improved verification
strategies.
To check how many unique states are reached in searches
that necessarily remain incomplete due to resource con-
straints (imposed by the time and/or memory bounds we
use), we perform the verifications in a mode where the
model checker records every state visited in a binary file. For
a swarm run, we combine the data from all individual runs,
to count the cumulative number of unique states covered in
all runs combined. We then compare these totals with the
number of reachable states given in Table 2, which were
obtained with standard exhaustive runs (as a reference),
where possible.
We run a large number of small verification jobs for each
application, each using a randomly different search
strategy. Any number larger than one can illustrate the
effect. There is no preset maximum to the number of swarm
runs, but clearly, at some point there will be no added
benefit from using still larger numbers of swarm runs. For
our test models, 100 runs are sufficient to illustrate the gains
convincingly: a notable increase in problem coverage. In
practice, the optimal number of runs to be performed will
depend on the available resources: the amount of memory
and the length of time available and the number of cores or
CPUs that is available.
For search diversification, we varied the number of
hash-functions randomly between 1 and 3, and used a
different type of hash-function for each of the 100 runs.
SPIN version 5.2 has 100 different hash-functions pre-
defined that are selectable with the runtime -h parameter,
which sufficed for these experiments. For randomization
we used a different seed for the random number
generator for each run performed, using a file with
100 random numbers. For all measurements on the
models, from Table 2 we further randomly chose one of
the following four precompiled executables for each run:
1. the standard depth-first search, with randomization
of both process scheduling decisions and transition
selection decisions,
2. the same search as in 1, but with default process
scheduling choices reversed (using pan.c compiler
directive -DREVERSE),
3. the same search as in 1, but with the default
transition selection choices reversed (using pan.c
compiler directive -DT_REVERSE)
4. the same search as in 1, but with both process
scheduling choices and transition selection choices
reversed by default.
Each set of one hundred runs for each application was
repeated several times, using different memory constraints,
performing thousands of separate runs. Table 3 first shows
the fraction as a percentage of all system states that were
reached for each of the first three models, for three sample
sets of 100 runs (see also Table 4).
Fig. 2 gives more detailed coverage numbers for the pftp
application, over a broader range of memory sizes. In this
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TABLE 3
Coverage Using Diversification
TABLE 4
Swarm Runs (Fig. 2 and Table 3)
Fig. 2. Relative coverage realized for the pftp application by a set of one
hundred swarm runs (solid line, top), compared with single bit-state runs
(dashed line, bottom) for a range of different memory constraints (see
also Appendix A).case, we varied the memory size from 8 KB (-w16) through
256 KB (-w21) for the swarm runs (top, solid curve), and
from 8 KB through 4 MB (-w25) for a series of single bit-
state runs (bottom, dashed curve). The detailed results of all
three sets of measurements can be found in Tables 5 and 6.
Remarkably, when using just 8 KB (1.2 percent of what is
required for an exhaustive verification run), the swarm run
for the pftp model already reaches 63 percent of all system
states, while a single bit-state run in the same amount of
memory covers no more than 7.6 percent. Viewed differ-
ently, by reading the chart horizontally instead of vertically,
to realize the same coverage as the 8 KB swarm run we
would have to use 32 times as much memory with a single
bit-state run (increasing the memory arena that is used from
-w16 to -w21).
When memory is restricted, as it will be in our target
domain of application, this means that we can increase
coverage by about an order of magnitude by performing a
set of swarm runs. The results for the cambridge and dtp
models are similar, and not separately shown.
For the DEOS model we performed six sets of 100 runs,
varying the available memory size from 512 KB to 16 MB.
We compared the results with the performance of 11 single
bit-state runs, ranging from a memory arena of 512 KB
through 512 MB. Three sets of bit-state runs were done,
using three different settings of the number of hash-
functions (using -k1, -k2, and -k5). Finally, the swarm runs
were also performed twice, once with all the randomiza-
tions described before and once without the -DREVERSE
and -DT_REVERSE options (variants 2, 3, and 4 from our
list). The results are shown in Fig. 3. All measurement detail
for Fig. 3 is also included in Tables 6 and 7.
For this large application we used all available optimiza-
tions, including partial order reduction, to reduce the large
statespacesizeasmuchaspossible.Tobeabletocomparethe
cumulativeeffectiveness oftherandomizedruns withthat of
a single bit-state runs in the same memory arena, we again
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TABLE 5
Single Bit-State Runs (Fig. 2)
TABLE 6
DEOS Model, Swarm Runs (Fig. 3)
Randomization Only (l) and with Diversification (r)
Fig. 3. Relative coverage realized for the DEOS model by two sets of 100 randomized swarm runs (solid lines, top) compared with three standard
bit-state hashing runs using one (dashed, bottom), two (dash-dotted, middle), and five (dotted, top) bits set per state, in memory arenas that range
from 512 KB (-w22) to 512 MB (-w32). The gray horizontal line indicates the total number of reachable states (22,452,390) for this model. The top
solid line includes full diversification of swarm runs. The one slighty below it does not include the reversed scheduling and transition selection
options. See also Tables 6 and 7.recorded all states reached into files and counted unique
states across all swarm runs with a postprocessing step.
The time taken by each bit-state run depends on the size
of the memory arena, and thereby the maximum number of
states that is explored per run. Because all randomized runs
in a swarm set are independent, they can all be performed in
parallel, and cumulatively need to take no longer than a
single run. If we compare the coverage of the swarm runs
with the bit-state runs therefore, it is important to note that
each individual bit-state run takes more and more time as
we relax the memory constraints while moving to the right
in Figs. 2 and 3, making these search alternatives less and
less attractive.
In this study, we are primarily interested in cases where,
for a given problem size, externally imposed constraints on
memory and runtime prevent us from completing an
exhaustive verification. This means that we are most
interested in the data shown on the left-hand side of Figs. 2
and 3.
If we consider the leftmost point in Fig. 3, we see that the
best single bit-state run realized a problem coverage of
4.3 percent (reaching 960,743 out of 22,452,390 states). The
swarm runs, completing 100 randomly different runs, each
using no more memory or time than the single run,
realizing coverage near 41 percent (reaching 9,126,333
states). Neither run realizes exhaustive coverage, but the
swarm method improved our coverage of the search
problem by nearly an order of magnitude. Adding more
runs can improve coverage further, but we can expect that it
will take an exponentially increasing number of runs to
continue to expand coverage in a meaningful way.
As intended, this approach benefits from massive
parallelism, as we expect it to increasingly become available
for routine use. At -w26, the swarm runs reach 100 percent
coverage of the search space, using just 8 MB of memory per
run, or 0.075 percent of the 13 GB that would be required to
complete an exhaustive verification. The best bit-state run
realizes only 50 percent coverage in the same memory arena
(see the top dotted line in Fig. 3). The cumulative number of
states in the swarm runs can be seen to slightly exceed the
number that is reached in an exhaustive run. This effect is
caused by the use of the partial order reduction, which could
cause a slightly different number of states to be reached,
depending on where truncations in the bit-state runs occur.
One more set of measurements was performed for the
fleet model, as an example of a model that cannot be
exhaustively verified within reasonable resource con-
straints. One version of this model has a known assertion
violation that can be triggered through a manually guided
simulation in about 350 execution steps.
The model is over 1,000 lines of text and each system
state takes 1,440 bytes to store in exhaustive verification
mode. An attempt to perform a full verification on a
2.3 GHz machine with 32 GB of memory runs at roughly
105 states per second, and exhausts memory in 195 seconds,
without reporting the error. At this point the search has
explored 23.4 million reachable system states, which
corresponds to an unknowable fraction of the total reach-
able state space. A search using -DCOLLAPSE compression
(a predefined lossless state compression mode in SPIN)
reaches 327.6 million states before running out of memory
after 3,320 seconds of runtime, also without revealing the
error. A run with the hash-compact algorithm (a stronger,
but not lossless, form of compression) runs out of memory
after 1,910 seconds and increases the coverage to 537 million
states. The most aggressive bit-state run we can perform
under the given constraints, using all 32 GB of memory,
runs for 34 days and explores well over 1011 system states.
None of these search attempts succeeds in locating the
assertion failure.
The 34-day bit-state run finishes with a low hash-factor
(meaning that most bits in the hash-array were set), still
providing little guidance on the fraction of the reachable
state space was explored. Likely, the full reachable state
space for this problem is much larger than what can
be searched or stored by any verification method. The bit-
state run can be performed in parallel on eight CPUs,
shrinking the runtime from 34 days to about 5 days, but
without change in coverage.
To explore the coverage that can be realized with swarm
verification runs for this problem, we performed a series of
measurements similar to the ones described for the DEOS
model, using the full set of search randomization and
diversification options we have described. We performed
seven sets of 100 swarm runs, varying the available memory
size from 512 KB to 32 MB. The swarm runs can be
extended to also larger memory sizes, but the number of
reached states becomes too large to store, sort, and count
with the method we are using, so no further data points
were obtained. In these swarm runs, the assertion violation
is readily found. We also performed 11 single bit-state runs
for comparison, repeated twice, using, respectively, one bit
per state and five bits per state. The results of the
measurements are shown in Fig. 4, and should be compared
with the curves shown for the more complete data set for
the DEOS model from Fig. 3. The measurement detail is
included in Table 8.
The part of the curve that we are exploring for the fleet
application is clearly in the range that we have defined to be
our primary target for large search problems. To obtain the
rightmost data point on the curve shown in Fig. 4 required a
bit-state run that took roughly 10 hours and 22 minutes on
our 2.3 GHz machine, using a memory arena of 512 MB. The
largest swarm run we performed in a memory arena of just
32 MB can be completed 15.3 times faster, in 41 minutes,
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TABLE 7
DEOS Model, Single Bit-State Runs (Fig. 3)while covering 2.6 times more states (close to 8 billion
compared to 3 billion).
Seen another way, the 3 billion states that require over
10 hours to compute with a traditional sequential bit-state
run can be reached in about 16 minutes with a parallel and
randomized swarm run using 100 cores, or about 40 times
faster. The parallel runs can be performed on networked
computers, in a cloud or grid arrangement, with each
individual run using the maximum amount of memory
available to maximize the coverage that could be obtained
with this technique.
4.3 Scaling Behavior
In applications of distributed algorithms we are especially
interested in studying how a particular algorithm or
methodology will scale with the use of increasing numbers
of processes. The ideal scaling behavior then would be to
achieve linear or near-linear scaling. With the swarm
technique we have described here, we would like to see
how problem coverage (measured as the fraction of the
cumulative number of all reachable states covered in a
swarm run) changes with the use of increasing numbers of
CPUs or CPU-cores. For these measurements we chose the
DEOS model. It is sufficiently large to make meaningful
measurements, but not so large that we can no longer
determine what the full state space size is. We measured
how coverage changes with increasing numbers of CPUs for
four different memory sizes: 1, 2, 4, and 8 Mbyte. These
sizes correspond to, respectively, 0.01 percent, 0.02 percent,
0.03 percent, and 0.06 percent of the 13 GByte of memory
that would be required to complete a traditional exhaustive
search. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
The top curve, corresponding to the use of 8 MByte of
storage with runtime parameter -w26, reaches to 100 percent
coverage. Theother three curves correspond to an increasing
disparitybetweenproblemsizeandamountofmemoryused.
We can expect that these curves too will reach 100 percent
coverageifextendedtowardtheright,buttheyrequirelarger
numbers of swarm runs to do so.
The effect of reducing the amount of memory used then
is two-fold:
. The runs complete faster (since each run will explore
a smaller number of states). For instance, the runs for
-w25 take half as long as those for -w26, etc.
. More runs are required to reach full coverage: The
slope of the cumulative coverage curve decreases. All
these runs can be performed in parallel, so all can, in
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Fig. 4. Relative coverage realized for the fleet application with 100 randomized swarm runs (solid line, top) compared with standard bit-state hashing
runs using one (dotted, middle), and five (dashed, bottom) bits per state, in memory arenas that range from 512 KB (-w22) to 512 MB (-w32). The
total number of reachable states for this model is unknown, but was estimated it to be > 1011 reachable states. This is the problem size after the
application of partial order reduction (which can itself reduce the overall state space size by an exponential amount). See also Appendix A, Table 8.
TABLE 8
Fleet Model (Fig. 4)principle, complete in the same time it takes to
perform one single run, provided a sufficient
number of CPUs is available.
Toward the left side of the range shown in Fig. 5, the
relative effect of adding additional swarm runs is quite
significant, beating linear increases. Toward the right, as we
approach full coverage, the effect of additional runs
diminishes, as can be expected.
For very large applications, which are the focus of this
paper, we are most likely to operate in a range where
exhaustive coverage is out of reach, i.e., the bottom curve in
Fig. 5, where increases in the number of swarm runs
performed is most effective.
5T HE SWARM TOOL
Even though all search variants that we have described here
are supported asstandard search options in SPIN version 5.2
and later, it may not always be easy to remember the entire
set and there is some work involved in setting up the
execution of large numbers of small verification jobs for a
s w a r mr u n .W eh a v et h e r e f o r ed e v e l o p e das w a r m
configuration tool that can automate these tasks. The tool
has a range of predefined search options built in, exploiting
both randomization and diversification, and can be updated
as new search variants are identified.
The Swarm tool allows the user to take full advantage of
search randomization and diversification options when
large numbers of CPUs or CPU-cores are available to tackle
a large search problem. The user is asked to specify just
three key constraints to a verification task: the amount of
memory that is available per run, the number of CPUs or
CPU-cores that can be used, and the maximum amount of
runtime that may be used to complete the search. Using
these parameters, the tool configures a swarm run that can
provide significantly greater coverage of the given search
problem within the stated constraints when compared to
single bit-state run. The tool allows the user to also define
additional parameters, such as the state size and the
average state exploration speed, but these parameters are
mostly used for fine-tuning the performance of a swarm run
when needed.
The tool is built as a verification script generator, and is
written in about 800 lines of C. The swarm tool generates a
shell script that performs as many different types of
verification runs as possible without exceeding user-
defined constraints on time and memory use.
1 The essence
of the configuration and script generation algorithm used in
the Swarm tool is shown in Figs. 6 and 7.
Given that the time and memory constraints are tightly
connected, the tool only needs to take the minimum of these
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Fig. 5. Cumulative coverage for DEOS, realized by 1;2;4;...;100 swarm runs, using between one (w23) and eight MByte (w26) of storage,
corresponding to between 0.01 percent and 0.06 percent of the memory required for exhaustive search. The horizontal dashed line indicates
100 percent coverage. The bottom curve corresponds to what would be linear scaling with the number of CPUs (i.e., swarm runs).
1. The tool is available from: http://spinroot.com/swarm/.
Fig. 6. Sample configuration for Swarm verification script generation.
Tmax is the total time available on all CPUs. The configuration tries to
find the best values for the size of the hash-array and the smallest
incremental step for varying depth-limits. If no runs can be scheduled,
the configuration attempt fails. Each pass through the outer-loop
reduces the size of the hash-arena, creating shorter verification runs,
using all available time.two constraints into consideration. For a given time limit,
for instance, Swarm can derive and estimate for the
maximum amount of memory that can be used. Swarm
first calculates how many states could maximally be
searched within the time and memory constraint that is
specified. It then sets up a series of bit-state runs within that
limit, using the variations we have discussed. Swarm
further adds variations of the maximum search depth, to
increase the diversification somewhat more.
The commands that are generated include standard,
randomized, and reverse depth-first search orders, using
varying numbers and types of hash-functions per run. In a
small amount of time, hundreds of different searches can
thus be performed, each slightly different, probing different
parts of an oversized search space.
A typical command line invocation of the Swarm tool is
as follows:
$ swarm -c4 -m1G -t1 -f model.pml
For this run we specified the availability of 4 CPU cores,
and up to 1 GB of memory per run. The -t parameter was
used to set the time limit for all runs combined to one hour
(which is also the default). The swarm tool writes the
verification script into a file with the same basename as the
verification model, but replacing the extension.pml with
extension.swarm, e.g., for the example above the result is
written into a file named model.swarm. The verification can
now be performed by simply executing the script.
As a simple example, a swarm run for the fleet model can
be setup for an eight-core system and a one-hour time limit,
as follows:
$ export CCOMMON =“-DVECTORSZ = 1500”
$ swarm -b1440 -s35000 -c8 -t1 \
-f fleet.pml
Swarm: 96 runs, avg per cpu 3599.6 sec
Swarm: script written to fleet.swarm
$ ./fleet.swarm
In this example, we first used an environment variable to
define compilation directives we would like to use for all
verification jobs. The invocation of the swarm command
then defines the state-size to be 1,440 bytes, and gives an
estimated processing speed (measured in earlier verifica-
tion attempts) of 35,000 states per second. In this case,
swarm generated a script with 96 randomized runs, with an
estimated completion time of 3,599 seconds—within one
hour, as requested.
Executing the script finds the assertion violation we have
described for the fleet model within a few seconds. In this
case this is by virtue of one of the search variations that is a
standard part of Swarm’s mix: a reverse depth-first search.
The assertion violation, as it turns out, is normally
encountered only toward the very end of the standard
depth-first order used by SPIN, but resource limits
normally prevent us from reaching that point in the search.
The error is trivially found near the start of the search if the
depth-first search order is reversed and, as we saw earlier,
the chances of finding are significantly increased if we use
randomized search orders as well.
The Swarm tool can read configuration parameters from
the command line and from environment variables, as we
have shown in the examples above, but it can also read
them from a configuration script that is stored as an plain
text file. A default configuration file can be generated by the
tool itself with a runtime option: “swarm -l.” The user can
edit the configuration file to adjust the parameter settings
for a specific application. The default file defines eight
different ways to compile the model checking engine itself,
using forward, reversed, randomized process and transition
orderings. As new search modes are defined, they can be
added to the set and, when specific variants are not desired
in a particular application, they can be removed. The
methodology is therefore not restricted to leveraging
diversified verification runs, as we have discussed so far,
but could also be applied more generally.
The line in the configuration script that defines the
number of available cpus, e.g.,
cpus 4
can also specify the use of remote computers, provided that
they are setup to allow password-less ssh connections. For
instance, if we want to define a run using four CPUs on the
local machine, eight on a remote machine called nada, and
six more on a remote machine called niks, for a total of
4 þ 8 þ 6 ¼ 18 CPUs, we would specify this as:
cpus 4 nada:8 niks:6
and swarm will take care of the rest.
This setup gives us a flexible and general methodology
for tackling large search problems that we expect will be
increasingly common.
6R ELATED WORK
Randomization is a well-known method for the partial
exploration of large search spaces. One of the first descrip-
tions of a random walk technique for protocol validation is,
for instance, [18]. This method was applied with an
extension of the Murphi model checker in [20] and used in
combination with a breadth-first search discipline. Stateless
search methods such as random testing and random
simulation methods have an even longer history, cf. [1].
Heuristic and random pruning of statespaces in model
checking tools also has a very rich and long history, from the
scatter searching method in Trace [5] to the random search
methods used in Lurch [16]. Parallelization methods and
diversification strategies have also been applied in closely
related fields, such as SAT solving [13], [15], and SMT
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Fig. 7. Sample script generation. Each call to AddRuns adds a run into
the script to be executed by each CPU, if possible within the time limit.
For each addition, a different compilation mode (m) and search depth-
limit (d) is used. Random choices are made for the type and number of
hash-functions, and the seed for the random number generator.solving [22]. A detailed overview of attempts to develop
distributed algorithms for solving the model checking
problem directly (an approach that is orthogonal to the one
described in this paper) can be found elsewhere, e.g., in [11].
The closest method to our approach is the one that was
described in [3], which focused on the verification of Java
code with the Java Pathfinder tool, also using parallelism
and randomization, but not search diversification.
Different from this earlier work, we set a firm upper limit
on the amount of time that can be used for a run and use a
tool to find the best configuration of runs that takes
advantage of the available resources within given time
constraints. The swarm method uses the available informa-
tion to configure a large set of diversified and randomized
parallel runs. Swarm is defined as a relatively simple front-
end to SPIN that requires no changes in SPIN itself to
leverage the new capabilities. Extensions for newly devel-
oped search algorithms, furthermore, are trivial to add,
requiring no change in either SWARM or SPIN.
7C ONCLUSION
It is often assumed that the best strategy for tackling large
verification problems with SPIN is to use all available
memory in a maximal bit-state search. The number of
system states reached in such a search can be significantly
larger than what is covered in a standard exhaustive
verification run, which quickly exhausts memory in these
cases. Technically, one could cover still more states with
aggressive compression techniques, such as SPIN’s built-in
minimized automaton verification algorithm, but the
runtime penalty for doing so can be prohibitive in the
cases of interest here.
We have noted that as memory sizes continue to grow, at
fixed processor clock-speeds, the runtime cost of a maximal
bit-state run can also become prohibitively expensive. Once
the time required for performing a verification run
increases to weeks or months, the capability loses most of
its appeal, no matter how many reachable states it can
cover. The same is true for all other known approaches to
the model checking problem.
We have described a method that allows us to perform
verifications for very large problem sizes within user-
defined time or memory bounds, while exploiting the
multi-CPU and multicore capabilities in a more funda-
mental way. The method we have described uses parallelism
and search diversity to optimize verification coverage.
Allsearchalgorithmsmustaddresstheproblemoffinding
the proverbial needle in a haystack. The odds of finding the
needle trivially depend on both the size of the haystack and
the size of the needle. Swarm verifications use the principle
that we can increase the odds of finding the needle by using
more workers, all searching the large haystack in parallel,
provided that they do not all look in the same place. The
fundamentals of the search problem do of course remain
unaltered. If the haystack is infinitely large, the needle
infinitely small, and both available time and the number of
workers is finite, basic statistics will tell us that it would be
unwisetobetthattheneedlewillalwaysbefound.Yet,aswe
haveshown,wecanincreasetheoddsoffindingitbycloseto
an order of magnitude. Swarm verifications use the one
element that has so far been underutilized in applications of
model checking and that is to use large numbers of parallel
workers in a diversified search strategy.
We have measured the effectiveness of the swarm
approach in different ways. We first used a simple model
to generate all 32-bit word values and used diversified
search to match randomly placed targets in this very large
search space. In these measurements, we saw the effective-
ness of the search increase from 4 to 100 percent, using a
relatively small number of different search algorithms. In a
second experiment, we looked for hard-to-find assertion
violations in both medium size and very large SPIN models.
For the very large problem sizes, standard bit-state searches
in the maximal amount of memory available can still fail to
locate the errors in weeks of computation. The swarm
approach succeeds even when strict time bounds are
imposed, e.g., of one hour. We compared the number of
states reached in swarm runs with comparable individual
bit-state runs and again saw improvements in coverage of
over an order of magnitude.
Largeverificationproblemsshouldbeexpectedtobecome
increasingly common in the application of logic model
checkers to software verification. The use of diversified
parallel approaches becomes more attractive as the number
of processing cores and memory sizes (but not clock speeds)
on standard desktop systems continues to increase.
The search method we have described can be extended
in many other ways, for instance by adding context-
bounded search options as described in [14], [19], [12].
Such extensions can be made by editing a Swarm config-
uration file, and require no changes in the Swarm tool itself.
We expect many other search variants to be added in years
to come to enrich the set of available choices for search
diversification.
An often underestimated aspect of new techniques is
the amount of training that will be required to fully
leverage them. This is perhaps one of the stronger points
in favor of the swarm tool. It would be hard to argue that
the use of this tool requires more training than a cursory
reading of the manual page.
APPENDIX A
MEASUREMENT DETAIL
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 detail the numbers of states reached in
each measurement reported in Figs. 2, 3, and 4 and Table 3.
For the five applications used for the measurements in
section 4 of this paper, the model checking code was
generated as follows:
$ spin -a dtp.pml
$ spin -a -o1 -o2 -o3 -o4 pftp.pml
$ spin -a cambridge.pml
$ spin -a DEOS.pml
$ spin -a fleet.pml
In each case, the model checking code generated was
compiled for the single bit-state runs with the following
command:
$ gcc -O2 -DSAFETY -DBITSTATE -o pan pan.c,
As discussed in the paper, for the dtp, pftp, and cambridge
applications, we further included the compilation directive
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more meaningful value.
For the swarm runs, we added the compilation directives
-DP_RAND and -DT_RAND to enable randomization, and
we used the four possible uses/nonuses of directives
-DREVERSE and -DT_REVERSE, as discussed in the paper.
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